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Abstract

CCS Concepts: • Security and privacy → Logic and verification; Hardware security implementation; Software
security engineering.

Hardware-assisted reference monitoring is receiving increasing attention as a way to improve the security of existing
software. One example is the PIPE architecture extension,
which attaches metadata tags to register and memory values
and executes tag-based rules at each machine instruction to
enforce a software-defined security policy. To use PIPE effectively, engineers should be able to write security policies in
terms of source-level concepts like functions, local variables,
and structured control operators, which are not visible at
machine level. It is the job of the compiler to generate PIPEaware machine code that enforces these source-level policies.
The compiler thus becomes part of the monitored system’s
trusted computing base—and hence a prime candidate for
verification.
To formalize compiler correctness in this setting, we extend the source language semantics with its own form of
user-specified tag-based monitoring, and show that the compiler preserves that monitoring behavior. The challenges of
compilation include mapping source-level monitoring policies to instruction-level tag rules, preserving fail-stop behaviors, and satisfying the surprisingly complex preconditions
for conventional optimizations. In this paper, we describe
the design and verification of Tagine, a small prototype compiler that translates a simple tagged WHILE language to a
tagged register transfer language and performs simple optimizations. Tagine is based on the RTLgen and Deadcode
phases of the CompCert compiler, and hence is written and
verified in Coq. This work is a first step toward verification
of a full-scale compiler for a realistic tagged source language.

Keywords: verified compilers, reference monitors, tag-based
secure hardware, Coq proof assistant
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Introduction

Reference monitors [2, 21] are a powerful mechanism for
dynamic enforcement of software security policies such as
access control, memory safety [18], and information-flow
control (IFC). Monitors interpose a validation test at each
security-relevant program point and cause the program to
fail-stop in the event of a security violation. They are used
in settings where the underlying software cannot easily be
modified or perhaps even inspected. This makes them an
important tool of the security engineer—somebody tasked
with improving system security, often not the original programmer. However, monitoring is expensive to implement
in software, even when applied only at coarse granularity,
e.g. only at function calls.
Recent work has shown that hardware-assisted monitoring approaches can enforce fine-grained security policies
while still providing good performance. For example, PIPE [7,
19] (Processor Interlocks for Policy Enforcement)1 is a programmable hardware mechanism for supporting reference
monitors at the granularity of individual instructions. In a
processor architecture extended with PIPE, metadata tags
are associated with each value in memory and registers. Just
before each instruction executes, PIPE checks its opcode
and the tags on its operands to see if the operation should
be permitted, and if so, what tags should be assigned to
the instruction’s results. These tag rules collectively form

Publication rights licensed to ACM. ACM acknowledges that this contribution was authored or co-authored by an employee, contractor or affiliate of
the United States government. As such, the Government retains a nonexclusive, royalty-free right to publish or reproduce this article, or to allow
others to do so, for Government purposes only.
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© 2021 Copyright held by the owner/author(s). Publication rights licensed
to ACM.
ACM ISBN 978-1-4503-8299-1/21/01. . . $15.00
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1 In

previous and contemporaneous work, variants of PIPE are also called
PUMP, SDMP, or CoreGuard.
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a micro-policy [4] (hereinafter simply policy). Tag rules are
implemented in software (running in a privileged supervisor
context or on a dedicated co-processor), so policies are completely flexible in how they interpret tags and gate machine
operations. Adding software checks at per-instruction granularity would be far too expensive, so the results of tag rules
are stored in a fast hardware cache. In a well-designed policy, the cache hit rate will be high, so most instructions will
execute at full speed. Experiments have shown reasonable
performance on a range of useful policies [7, 8, 19].
However, the PIPE approach does have some limitations.
Defining tag rules at the level of the machine ISA is a difficult
task for the security engineer, much as writing machine code
is harder than working in a high-level language. In principle,
working at the instruction level minimizes the trusted computing base (TCB) of the monitoring system; in particular,
security properties are enforced independently of how the
machine code was produced. In practice, however, writing
useful policies often requires understanding the output of a
particular compiler. For example, a policy intended to guarantee integrity of the stack [19] must have at least partial
knowledge of how the compiler lays out stack frames and
which generated instructions are performing stack manipulation. This kind of reverse engineering is both tedious and
error-prone.
More fundamentally, some policies can only be expressed
in terms of high-level code features that are not preserved at
machine level. For example, an access control policy might
wish to gate entry to a function by inspecting the tags on its
arguments, but it may not be clear at machine level where
those arguments live. A memory safety policy may want to
distinguish accesses to local variables from accesses to the
heap, even though both are compiled into the same machinelevel load and store instructions. Or an IFC policy may want
to delimit the scope of implicit flows [6] based on knowledge
of the structured control flow (e.g. if-then-else constructs)
in the source program, which is not explicitly visible in machine code.
We therefore propose defining policies in a high-level
source language, compiling to PIPE-compatible code, and including the compiler within the TCB. We extend a high-level
language with a tag-based reference monitoring semantics,
and implement this extended language by compilation to
machine code for a PIPE-equipped processor. In the source
language, tag rules are triggered at meaningful control points
in the dynamic semantics, such as evaluation of arithmetic
operators, reading or writing variables, function entry and
return, and split and join points in the control-flow graph.
We use hardware-level tags on the generated instructions
to trace their provenance back to the source-level construct
(and associated control point and tag rule) that produced
them.
Since the compiler is now in the TCB, it is essential that
it correctly implements the intended monitoring semantics,

in particular the fail-stop behavior. So we verify it. In this
paper, we present Tagine, a verified compiler that includes a
translator from a simple WHILE language (with expressions,
statements, and functions) to an instruction-level language
of control flow graphs, and a simple dead-code removal optimization for the instruction-level language. Tagine is based
on the RTLgen and Deadcode passes of the CompCert C compiler [15]; consequently, it is written in Gallina and verified
in Coq. We have also implemented (though not verified) a
tagged common-subexpression elimination (CSE) optimization based on CompCert’s CSE pass, and designed (though
not implemented) a tagged version of CompCert’s ConstProp
pass.
Our initial work focuses on these compiler passes in order to study the most novel aspects of tagged compilation:
moving from source-level control points to per-instruction
rules, and performing optimizations in the presence of tag
rules. Our key verification result is policy preservation: Tagine correctly preserves fail-stop behavior as well as standard
semantics in the target code. Although Tagine is currently
lacking many important high-level language features, notably memory and pointers, we believe it can be scaled up to
a full compiler for Tagged C, a version of C extended with
control points and tagging that we are currently designing.
This paper makes the following contributions:
• We describe a general scheme for implementing tagbased fine-grained reference monitoring in high-level
language programs by compilation to PIPE-equipped
hardware.
• We instantiate this scheme on simple source and target
languages equipped with tag-based monitoring and
implement the translation from source to target.
• We verify in Coq that the translation preserves monitoring semantics.
• We analyze the requirements for performing standard
optimizations, including dead-code elimination, common-subexpression elimination, and constant propagation, in the tagged setting.
• We implement and verify in Coq the dead-code elimination optimization, and implement the CSE optimization.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. §2 gives
background on the underlying PIPE tagged hardware architecture. §3 shows how the idea of tagged monitoring can be
extended to a high-level language. §4 outlines our general
approach to compiling a tagged high-level language to PIPE.
§5 formalizes Tagine’s key pass, RTLgenT , and describes
its verification. §6 discusses optimizations. §7 gives a brief
overview of our Coq development. §8 describes related work.
§9 describes future work and concludes. The complete Coq
sources for Tagine may be found at https://github.com/hopepdx/Tagine-public.
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PIPE

A policy is a complete collection of tag rules covering
all the ISA’s opcodes. As a very simple example, we sketch
an IFC policy intended to enforce confidentiality. Suppose
we wish to distinguish public and secret values and prevent
the program from writing secret values to certain memory
locations L representing public channels. To implement this
scheme, we can use single boolean values for both value
and PC tags, where true means secret and false means
public. We ignore instruction tags in this policy; their utility
is explained in §4. We assume that values in memory have
been pre-tagged appropriately; in particular, the values in L
are tagged false. New values computed from secrets should
also be secret. Also, to detect implicit flows, we maintain a
“security context level” in the PC tag; initially set to false, it
is raised to true if we test a secret value, since this can be
used to expose the secret. Here are some of the rules for this
policy (the other rules are similar):

PIPE is a collection of architectural features that extend a
standard ISA (such as X86, ARM, or RISC-V) with support
for tag-based, per-instruction monitoring. The design has
been developed over the past eight years by a collaboration of
industrial and academic researchers, partly under the aegis of
several DARPA programs. Open-source hardware simulators
and simple OS ports are available [11], and IP incorporating
the designs is currently marketed commercially by Draper
Labs and Dover Microsystems [10].
PIPE augments architectural state by associating a metadata tag with each value in a register or memory location.
Since instructions live in memory, each instruction has a
tag. In addition, the processor maintains a PC tag conceptually associated with the program counter value; this tag
holds metadata characterizing the current control state of
the program. Tags are intended to be large—roughly the size
of pointers in the underlying architecture. PIPE hardware
makes no assumptions about the structure or meaning of
tags, which are completely configurable in software.
On each instruction, a PIPE-equipped processor evaluates
a tag rule to determine whether the instruction should be
permitted to execute, and if so, what tags to put on its result values. A distinct tag rule can be associated with each
instruction op code; the inputs and outputs of the tag rule
are op-code specific. We write op for the tag rule associated
with instruction op. For example, the RISC-V instruction
add 𝑟𝑑 ,𝑟𝑠 1 ,𝑟𝑠 2 , which adds the contents of registers rs1 and
rs2 and stores the result in register rd , has a tag rule with
signature

add(𝑡𝑖, 𝑡𝑝𝑐, 𝑡𝑠 1, 𝑡𝑠 2 ) ≜
OK(𝑡𝑝𝑐 ′ = 𝑡𝑝𝑐, 𝑡𝑑 = 𝑡𝑠 1 ∨ 𝑡𝑠 2 ∨ 𝑡𝑝𝑐)
beq(𝑡𝑖, 𝑡𝑝𝑐, 𝑡𝑠 1, 𝑡𝑠 2 ) ≜
OK(𝑡𝑝𝑐 ′ = 𝑡𝑠 1 ∨ 𝑡𝑠 2 ∨ 𝑡𝑝𝑐)
stw(𝑡𝑖, 𝑡𝑝𝑐, 𝑡𝑠 1, 𝑡𝑠 2, 𝑡𝑚) ≜
if (𝑡𝑠 2 ∨ 𝑡𝑝𝑐) → 𝑡𝑚
then OK(𝑡𝑝𝑐 ′ = 𝑡𝑝𝑐, 𝑡𝑚 ′ = 𝑡𝑚)
else Error
One unfortunate feature of this policy is that once the PC
tag has been raised by beq, it remains secret indefinitely; this
is a form of “label creep” [20]. While it would be sound to
lower the PC tag back to public when control reaches a join
point following both branches of the conditional, this is hard
to do in a machine-level policy because such join points are
not explicit in machine code. We return to this issue in §3.
Software-defined policies are extremely flexible. The policy code can manage its own data structures, even treating
tags as pointers into its own (protected) memory space. This
is useful for combining policies by treating tags as (pointers
to) data structures containing the product of each policy’s
metadata. Policies can also maintain internal state that persists between rule invocations. For example, a memory safety
policy might maintain a counter to generate a fresh tag identifier for each object allocated in memory.
If every instruction of the PIPE-enhanced machine had
to evaluate a tag rule in software before executing, the system would be ridiculously slow. So PIPE relies on a rule
cache which contains the results of recent rule evaluations,
indexed by a tuple of instruction opcode and input tags. The
expectation is that in normal steady-state operation, most
instructions will find their tag rule result in the cache. The
rule evaluation software is invoked only in case of a cache
miss. When designing policies, care must be taken to avoid
writing rules that inhibit effective caching.

add:(ti, 𝑡𝑝𝑐, 𝑡𝑠 1, 𝑡𝑠 2 ) → OK(𝑡𝑝𝑐 ′, 𝑡𝑑) + Error
Here ti is the tag on the ADD instruction, 𝑡𝑠 1 and 𝑡𝑠 2 are the
tags on source registers 𝑟𝑠 1 and 𝑟𝑠 2 , and 𝑡𝑝𝑐 is the current PC
tag before the instruction executes. The rule result is either
OK or Error. In the Error case, the rule has decided that
the instruction should not be permitted to execute, and the
processor halts or raises a software interrupt to terminate
the process. In the OK case, execution continues, after setting
two result tags: 𝑡𝑑, the tag on the value written to destination
register 𝑟𝑑, and 𝑡𝑝𝑐 ′, the new PC tag after the instruction
executes.
As another example, the conditional branch instruction
beq 𝑟𝑠 1 ,𝑟𝑠 2 ,offset has the slightly simpler rule signature
beq:(𝑡𝑖, 𝑡𝑝𝑐, 𝑡𝑠 1, 𝑡𝑠 2 ) → OK(𝑡𝑝𝑐 ′) + Error
because there is no result value to tag. The rule for the store
instruction stw 𝑟𝑠 2 ,offset(𝑟𝑠 1 ) takes as an additional input the
tag 𝑡𝑚 of the old contents of the target memory location and
generates an additonal output tag 𝑡𝑚 ′ for the new contents:
stw:(𝑡𝑖, 𝑡𝑝𝑐, 𝑡𝑠 1, 𝑡𝑠 2, 𝑡𝑚) → OK(𝑡𝑝𝑐 ′, 𝑡𝑚 ′) + Error
The tag rules for other instructions follow similar patterns.
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where ⊲⊳ is an arbitrary binary comparison, 𝑡𝑙 and 𝑡𝑟 are the
tags of the compared values, 𝑡𝑝𝑐 and 𝑡𝑝𝑐 ′ are the PC tags
before and after rule execution, and 𝑡𝑝𝑐 0 is the original PC
tag at the split point corresponding to the join point being
executed. To show the motivation for this rule signature,
consider again the IFC secrecy policy from §2, this time
expressed using high-level language tag rules.

We next consider how to lift the idea of tag-based policies
from machine code to a higher-level language with features
such as expressions, structured control flow, and functions.
The key idea is to attach tag rules to control points in the
language’s execution semantics. Control points are placed
everywhere that a policy might want to inspect tags and possibly halt execution. Tags themselves have arbitrary structure
and significance, just as at the PIPE hardware level, and we
continue to assume that rule evaluation is implemented in
arbitrary software (not necessarily coded in the high-level
language being monitored). The tag rule for a control point is
passed the tags of relevant values in the environment and, in
some cases, returns tags for result values. Also, even though
there is no program counter in a high-level language, we
retain the idea of a “PC tag” that holds metadata associated
with the current control state of the program; it is passed to,
and possibly updated by, each tag rule.
For example, an assignment statement of the form 𝑥 ..=𝑒
has a control point with a tag rule of the form
.
.=:(𝑡𝑝𝑐, 𝑡𝑥, 𝑡𝑒)

⊕(𝑡𝑝𝑐, 𝑡𝑙, 𝑡𝑟 )
..=(𝑡𝑝𝑐, 𝑡𝑥, 𝑡𝑒)

IfSplit(𝑡𝑝𝑐, 𝑡𝑒)
IfJoin(𝑡𝑝𝑐, 𝑡𝑝𝑐 0 )

≜ OK(𝑡𝑝𝑐 ′ = 𝑡𝑝𝑐, 𝑡 ′ = 𝑡𝑙 ∨ 𝑡𝑟 ∨ 𝑡𝑝𝑐)
≜ if (𝑡𝑒 ∨ 𝑡𝑝𝑐) → 𝑡𝑥 then
OK(𝑡𝑝𝑐 ′ = 𝑡𝑝𝑐, 𝑡𝑥 ′ = 𝑡𝑥)
else Error
≜ OK(𝑡𝑝𝑐 ′ = 𝑡𝑒 ∨ 𝑡𝑝𝑐)
≜ OK(𝑡𝑝𝑐 ′ = 𝑡𝑝𝑐 0 )

Recall that we use the PC tag to track the “security context
level,” which needs to be raised to secret (true) when we are
executing conditionally under control of a secret, in order
to detect implicit flows. A key benefit of using high-level
language tag rules here is that the IfJoin control point rule
can reset the PC tag to its original value when control leaves
the if statement, thus potentially allowing subsequent statements to execute at lower secrecy. This rule is only sound
because, unlike the machine-level PIPE, the high-level language monitoring framework understands the semantics of
structured control flow operators. Other structured statements like while and case need similar control points.
Finally, control points are also placed before and after each
function call site and at each function entry and exit. Rules
executed at these points can inspect the tags on function
parameter values as well as on the function itself. Again, this
is also information that would be difficult or impossible to
collect at machine level.
Note that the set of control points and tag rule signatures
will typically be fixed once and for all when designing monitoring for the high-level language. They should therefore be
designed to be sufficiently general to implement any policy
of interest. Our control point design is based primarily on
consideration of IFC, memory safety, and compartmentalization policies. Of course, adequacy of the control point design
cannot be absolutely guaranteed, as new kinds of policies
may be invented later.

→ OK(𝑡𝑝𝑐 ′, 𝑡𝑥 ′) + Error

where 𝑡𝑒 is the tag on the value computed for 𝑒, 𝑡𝑥 and
𝑡𝑥 ′ are the tags on the contents of 𝑥 before and after the
assignment, and 𝑡𝑝𝑐 and 𝑡𝑝𝑐 ′ are the PC tags before and
after the assignment. Note that this rule closely resembles
the machine-level rule we saw above for STW, which is not
surprising given that an assignment might well be compiled
into a store. Similarly, each binary arithmetic expression
𝑙 ⊕ 𝑟 has a control point that triggers a tag rule
⊕:(𝑡𝑝𝑐, 𝑡𝑙, 𝑡𝑟 ) → OK(𝑡𝑝𝑐 ′, 𝑡 ′) + Error
where 𝑡𝑙 and 𝑡𝑟 are the tags of 𝑙 and 𝑟 , 𝑡𝑝𝑐 and 𝑡𝑝𝑐 ′ are the
PC tags before and after evaluation, and 𝑡 ′ is the tag to be
associated with the result of the operation. (For a language in
which expression evaluation cannot change program state,
it might make sense to prevent expression tag rules from
changing the PC tag, in which case 𝑡𝑝𝑐 ′ would not be included as part of the rule result.) This rule is similar to the
machine-level ADD rule, which again is unsurprising.
The control points for structured control statements are
more novel. The basic idea is to place a control point wherever the control flow graph splits or joins. For example, an
if-then-else statement has two control points, one at the
conditional test point and another at the join point following
the statement:
if 𝑒𝑙 ⊲⊳ 𝑒𝑟 ←− IfSplit
then 𝑠 1
else 𝑠 2
endif ←− IfJoin

4

Compilation Approach

Tag-based high-level language policies could be monitored
in software, e.g. by generating code to evaluate the rule functions and interleaving it with normal execution code in the
spirit of aspect-oriented weaving [13]. But given the density of control points, the overhead of this approach would
probably be very high. We instead opt to compile the tagged
high-level language to machine code for a PIPE-equipped
processor, in such a way that the reference monitoring behavior of the source is preserved in the target.

The associated tag rule forms are:
IfSplit(𝑡𝑝𝑐, ⊲⊳, 𝑡𝑙 , 𝑡𝑟 ) → OK(𝑡𝑝𝑐 ′) + Error
IfJoin(𝑡𝑝𝑐, 𝑡𝑝𝑐 0 ) → OK(𝑡𝑝𝑐 ′) + Error
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Such a policy-preserving compiler can be built by modifying a standard compiler from (untagged) source to (untagged)
target. The task is simplified by the fact that the structure
and meaning of tags is largely the same at both levels, and
invocations of the source-level tag rule evaluation code can
be embedded directly in the target-level rules.
The main challenge is that the high-level monitor associates tag rules with (language-dependent) control points,
whereas the PIPE framework associates them with each individual machine instruction. While some control points,
such as those at arithmetic operations, correspond naturally
to single instructions, others will correspond to multiple
instructions. Moreover, many different high-level features
will compile to instructions that use the same opcodes. For
example, an add instruction in the target code might be implementing an explicit addition expression in the source
code, but it might equally well have been generated by the
compiler as part of array addressing or stack frame management. Clearly the opcode alone is not sufficient to determine
which source tag rule should be executed at a given target
instruction.
To solve this problem, we rely on the fact that PIPE associates a separate tag 𝑡𝑖 with each instruction in memory, and
feeds it as one of the inputs to the rule evaluated at each execution step. Instruction tags (I-tags) effectively let us design
a customized instruction set that refines the hardware ISA
by providing different variants of some opcodes based on
the instruction’s semantic role in the policy being enforced.
Here, we use I-tags to specify provenance, i.e. the source
code construct from which the instruction was generated.
The opcode’s tag rule can dispatch on the I-tag to evaluate
the relevant source tag rule, if any, for each possible provenance. For example, if an add instruction is generated from
an explicit + expression, it might be tagged IT+, whereas
otherwise it might be tagged ITdc (for “don’t care”). The tag
rule for add could then be:

the PC tag into (the tag portion of) a register or onto the
stack until it is needed at the join point.2 Similar dummy
instructions may be needed to track the PC tag at other
structured control statements, or when marshalling the tags
of function arguments to feed them to a tag rule at a function
entry control point, etc.
To formalize correctness of a tag-aware compiler, we start
by defining semantics for source and target languages that
incorporate tag-based monitoring by construction. Both semantics are parameterized by tag policies; the source tag
rules are arbitrary, and the target tag rules embed the source
rules. Tag policy violations lead to fail-stop states, which
are distinct from stuck states or other kinds of errors. Then
a policy-preserving compiler is one that preserves both ordinary computation behaviors and fail-stop behaviors. In
particular, the compiler must not treat source policy errors
as undefined behaviors that can be refined into arbitrary
valid executions in the target.
In principle, a policy-preserving compiler can be completely ignorant of the actual source language policy, so that
a single version of the generated code can be used to enforce arbitrary source policies just by changing the tag rule
evaluation code. To achieve this, the source and target must
invoke the same sequence of source rules, with the same
arguments; since the rules are arbitrary, any change in a rule
invocation might change the fail-stop behavior of the overall
rule sequence. In addition to maximizing runtime flexibility,
this approach also keeps the compiler and its verification
relatively simple.
However, maintaining this policy-independence property
may slow down target code unnecessarily. For example, the
compilation scheme for saving and restoring PC tags described above introduces extra instructions and adds extra
pressure on register use, which may degrade performance:
if the policy being run doesn’t actually make use of the PC
tag, adding this overhead is pointless. More subtly, the need
to preserve arbitrary tag rule semantics inhibits the applicability of many simple code optimizations such as dead code
elimination, common subexpression elimination, or constant
folding and propagation. For example, a conventional optimizer might use a standard liveness analysis to eliminate
an add instruction if its result register value is never used.
However, in general it is not sound to skip evaluation of
the instruction’s associated tag rule. Although calculating
the tag on the instruction result is not important—since that
result is never used, its tag is not read either—the rule might
fail-stop, change the PC tag, or change internal policy state.
In general, determining statically whether a tag rule execution can be skipped is clearly uncomputable. However, our

add(𝑡𝑖, 𝑡𝑝𝑐, 𝑡𝑠 1, 𝑡𝑠 2 ) ≜
match 𝑡𝑖 with
IT+ ⇒ +(𝑡𝑝𝑐,𝑡𝑠 1 ,𝑡𝑠 2 )
ITdc ⇒ OK(𝑡𝑝𝑐 ′ = 𝑡𝑝𝑐, 𝑡𝑑 = 𝑡𝑠 1 )
where in the “don’t care” case we arbitrarily choose to propagate the left operand’s tag to the result tag.
This “piggybacking” technique, in which we trigger the
source control point rule check by attaching it to the PIPErule for an instruction that is already being generated, will
work for most source language constructs. But sometimes
a tag-aware compiler must generate additional instructions
into the target code just to manage tags. One example of
this is the if-then-else statement. As described in §3, the
PC tag at the control split point must be saved so it can be
passed to the IfJoin at the join point. To do this, we can
generate a target instruction at the split point (for example
a mov with a particular I-tag) whose only purpose is to copy

2 An

alternative approach would be for the policy to maintain a stack of
split point PC tags in the current PC tag itself, avoiding the need to plumb
them through the rules. Although this would be simpler than our scheme,
its worst-case rule cache efficiency would be poorer.
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analysis of the existing CompCert optimizations on scalar locals has identified several simple and intuitive conditions on
tag rules that, in various combinations, suffice to keep these
optimizations sound. These conditions might include not
fail-stopping, not altering the PC tag, or being insensitive to
the input PC tag. Thus, to enable optimizations, Tagine must
know at least something about the rules, but not necessarily
have their full definitions. Adopting this condition-based
approach helps decouple the compiler from the details of the
rules, and will allow the same compiled code to run with
multiple sets of rules as long as they obey the conditions.

5

literal constants
local variables
⊕ := + | −

𝑠 :=
|
|
|
|
|
|

empty/no-op
sequencing
assignment (to local)
ifs/conditionals
while loops
function calls
function returns

Skip
s;s
𝑥 ..= 𝑒
If (𝑒 ⊲⊳ 𝑒) Then 𝑠 Else 𝑠
While (𝑒 ⊲⊳ 𝑒) 𝑠
𝑥 = 𝑓 (®
𝑒)
Return(𝑒)

⊲⊳ := == | != | <= | < | >= | >

The RTLgenT Compiler Pass

relational operator

Figure 1. Syntax of HLL expressions and statements

To study the verification of policy preservation in detail,
we have designed and verified RTLgenT , a small prototype
compiler pass that translates HLL, a simple tagged WHILE
language (with expressions, statements, and functions) to
RTLT , an instruction-level language represented in an explicit control-flow graph (CFG). We focus on this compiler
pass because it is here that high-level program structures
(statements and expressions) are transformed into instructions, and hence where the tag rules for control points must
be attached to appropriate instruction positions.
HLL, RTLT and RTLgenT are closely based on the CminorSel and RTL languages and the RTLgen pass of the CompCert compiler [15], and our proof of policy preservation is
structured similarly to Leroy’s correctness proof. We prove
a forward simulation result which lifts into a refinement
result thanks to the determinism of the target language [15].
As usual, this proof involves establishing and maintaining a
matching relation between corresponding source and target
states. We believe this is one of the more challenging parts
of producing a full-scale CompCert variant for Tagged C,
which is our long-term goal.
5.1

𝑒 := v@t
| 𝑥
| 𝑒 ⊕𝑒

Const p t ⇒ t′
[eval Const]
𝐸, p ⊢ v@t ⇓ v@t′
𝐸 (𝑥) = v@t
Var p t ⇒ t′
[eval Var]
𝐸, p ⊢ 𝑥 ⇓ v@t′
𝐸, p ⊢ 𝑒 1 ⇓ v1 @t1
𝐸, p ⊢ 𝑒 2 ⇓ v2 @t2
⊕ p t1 t2 ⇒ t′
[eval Op]
𝐸, p ⊢ 𝑒 1 ⊕ 𝑒 2 ⇓ (v1 ⊕ v2 )@t′
Figure 2. Evaluation of HLL expressions (excluding errors)
general-purpose LOOP, BLOCK, and EXIT statements, because it is difficult to design sensible IFC policies for the
latter. A function definition consists of a parameter list, local
variable declarations, body (a statement), and a function tag
𝑝 ∈ P which will be made available to the tag rule executed
at function entry. A program is just a collection of functions,
with a distinguished main function.
Following CminorSel, we give a relational natural semantics for expressions, and a transition system for statements
and functions. For expressions, we define the judgement

The Source Language : HLL

HLL is a simple, untyped, deterministic, imperative language
with expressions, structured statements, and functions with
local variables. For simplicity, we assume that the language
has no I/O facilities, but the final value returned by the main
function is observable.
HLL’s semantics is implicitly parameterized by a highlevel rule policy P, which consists of a set of value tags T,
ranged over by 𝑡; a set of PC tags P, ranged over by p; a set
of tag rules covering all possible control points; and a set of
of possible tag errors carried by ERROR returns (which we
elided for simplicity in §2 and §3), ranged over by err.
Figure 1 describes the syntax of HLL expressions and statements, which are largely standard, except that literal constant
expressions are atoms [5], consisting of a natural number 𝑣
paired with a value tag 𝑡, written v@t and ranged over by
𝑎. HLL has explicit WHILE loops in place of CminorSel’s

𝐸, p ⊢ 𝑒 ⇓ (𝑎 + err)
where 𝑒 is the expression being evaluated, 𝐸 is the current
environment, mapping variable to atoms, and p is the current PC tag. The result of evaluation is either an atom 𝑎 or
a tag error err. Figure 2 gives the non-error cases for this
judgement, which are standard except for the tags and tag
rule invocations. We write ⇒ to indicate tag rule evaluation.
Henceforth we use metavariables (without explicit OK and
ERROR constructors) to indicate the type of rule results, and
adopt a juxtaposition-as-application style for rule arguments.
Since expressions are pure, we make the assumption that
no policy will ever need expression evaluation to change the
PC tag. We omit the error cases induced when a tag rules
returns an err; as usual, propagation of errors leads to an
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[Seq]

S(𝐹, (𝑠 1 ; 𝑠 2 ), 𝑘, p, 𝑐, 𝐸) → S(𝐹, 𝑠 1, (𝑠 2 ; 𝑘), p, 𝑐, 𝐸)
S(𝐹, Skip, (𝑠; 𝑘), p, 𝑐, 𝐸) → S(𝐹, 𝑠, 𝑘, p, 𝑐, 𝐸)

[SkipSeq]

join p ps ⇒ p′
S(𝐹, Skip, (join, ps ); 𝑘, p, 𝑐, 𝐸) → S(𝐹, Skip, 𝑘, p′, 𝑐, 𝐸)

[SkipJoin]

′ ′
..= p 𝑡
𝐸, p ⊢ 𝑒 ⇓ v@t
𝐸 (𝑥) = _@𝑡 old
old 𝑡 ⇒ (p , 𝑡 )
S(𝐹, (𝑥 ..= 𝑒), 𝑘, p, 𝑐, 𝐸) → S(𝐹, Skip, 𝑘, p′, 𝑐, 𝐸 [𝑥 ↦→ v@t′])

𝐸, p ⊢ 𝑒 1 ⇓ v1 @t1

𝐸, p ⊢ 𝑒 2 ⇓ v2 @t2

IfSplit p ⊲⊳ 𝑡 1 𝑡 2 ⇒ p′

[Assign]

𝑠 = if 𝑣 1 ⊲⊳ 𝑣 2 then 𝑠𝑡 else 𝑠 𝑓

S(𝐹, If (𝑒 1 ⊲⊳ 𝑒 2 ) Then 𝑠𝑡 Else 𝑠 𝑓 , 𝑘, p, 𝑐, 𝐸) → S(𝐹, 𝑠, (IfJoin, p); 𝑘, p′, 𝑐, 𝐸)

[Cond]

Figure 3. Selected HLL statement transitions.
explosion of judgements. The error rules fix the order of
sub-expression evaluation, since an error in the left operand
is propagated in favor of one in the right operand.
The semantics for HLL statements is given by a transition
system between program states S𝑡. The transition relation,
written S𝑡 → S𝑡 ′, describes a single execution step.
Borrowing from CompCert, we distinguish function internal, entry, and exit states, and add a new state E (err)
representing a fail-stop due to tag error err.
S𝑡 :=
|
|
|

S(𝐹, 𝑠, 𝑘, p, 𝑐, 𝐸)
C(𝐹, 𝑎,
® 𝑝, 𝑐)
R (𝑎, 𝑝, 𝑐)
E (err)

execution is described by the transitive closure of the steps
taken in the semantics from the initial state. Final states are
return states with an empty call stack, and are those in which
a program is considered to have terminated normally. There
are no transitions out of fail-stop states or final states.
A program may exhibit one of the following behaviors:
• Terminate with result 𝑎, when program execution
reaches a final state carrying 𝑎.
• Fail-stop with tag error 𝑒𝑟𝑟 , when program execution
reaches an error state carrying 𝑒𝑟𝑟 .
• Diverge, when program execution may always take
another step in the transition semantics.
• Go Wrong (or, “get stuck”), when program execution
cannot take a step in the transition semantics (but is
not in a fail-stop, or final state).

regular states
call states
return states
fail-stop states

Regular states correspond to execution within a function
and carry the current function 𝐹 ; the current program point,
represented by a statement-under-focus 𝑠 and a local continuation 𝑘; the current PC tag p; a call continuation 𝑐, representing the call stack; and a local environment 𝐸 that maps
variables to atoms. In call states, 𝐹 is the callee, and 𝑎® its
parameters. Return states carry a returned atom, 𝑎.
CompCert, following Appel and Blazy [3], combines local
and callstack continuations into one continuation, but we
find it simpler and clearer to separate them. Local continuations obey the following grammar:
𝑘 := emp
| 𝑠; 𝑘
| (join, ps ); 𝑘

We write 𝑆 P ⇓ 𝐵 to mean that a program 𝑆, executing under
policy P, exhibits behavior 𝐵. We use behaviors to help
formalize a notion of semantic preservation (§5.4).
Figure 3 gives transition judgements for a small selection
of statements. The non-tag aspects of these are standard.
Note that the local continuation grows under sequencing,
and is consumed when the statement under focus is Skip.
The semantics precisely specifies the position and signature
of each control point. For example, Assign evaluates the righthand side to an atom with tag 𝑡, fetches the tag 𝑡 old of the
existing value in 𝑥, and then passes them to ..= together with
the PC tag p. If the rule does not fail, it returns the new PC
tag 𝑝 ′ and a tag 𝑡 ′ to associate with the new value in 𝑥; we
step to a new regular state with the new PC tag and the
environment entry for 𝑥 suitably updated. AssignRuleErr (not
shown) applies when ..= returns a tag error err, in which case
we step to E (err).
The control point semantics for if-then-else are more
complicated. As discussed in §3, we want one control point
where the conditional is evaluated and another at the implicit join point following the statement. The first of these
is specified by the invocation of IfSplit in the premises of

return
continue with s, then do k
update PC tag; then do 𝑘

The novelty here is the PC tag update, which is explained
below. To save space and remain focused on the key ideas
of tag-based compilation, we will not discuss function calls,
function entry and exit states, or call continuations further
in this paper; for details, see the full Coq development.
An initial state (for a program) is the call state where 𝐹 is
main() (which takes no parameters) and 𝑐 is empty. Program
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𝐹𝑔 (𝑛) = nop 𝑛 ′ @ itag
nop itag p ⇒ p′
[exec Nop]
S(𝐹, 𝑛, p, 𝑐, 𝐵) → S(𝐹, 𝑛 ′, p′, 𝑐, 𝐵)
𝐵(𝑟𝑠 ) = v𝑠 @𝑡𝑠
𝐹𝑔 (𝑛) = mov 𝑟𝑠 𝑟𝑑 𝑛 ′ @ itag
𝐵(𝑟𝑑 ) = v𝑑 @𝑡𝑑
mov itag p t𝑠 t𝑑 ⇒ (p′, t′)
[exec Mov ]
S(𝐹, 𝑛, p, 𝑐, 𝐵) → S(𝐹, 𝑛 ′, p′, 𝑐, 𝐵 [𝑟𝑑 ↦→ v𝑠 @t′])
𝐹𝑔 (𝑛) = movi v@t 𝑟𝑑 𝑛 ′ @ itag
movi itag p t ⇒ (p′, t′)
[exec MovI]
S(𝐹, 𝑛, p, 𝑐, 𝐵) → S(𝐹, 𝑛 ′, p′, 𝑐, 𝐵 [𝑟𝑑 ↦→ v@t′])
𝐹𝑔 (𝑛) = op ⊕ 𝑟 1 𝑟 2 𝑟𝑑 𝑛 ′ @ itag
𝐵(𝑟 1 ) = v1 @𝑡 1
𝐵(𝑟 2 ) = v2 @𝑡 2
op ⊕ itag p 𝑡 1 𝑡 2 ⇒ (p′, t′)
[exec Op]
S(𝐹, 𝑛, p, 𝑐, 𝐵) → S(𝐹, 𝑛 ′, p′, 𝑐, 𝐵 [𝑟𝑑 ↦→ (v1 ⊕ v2 )@t′])
cond⊲⊳ itag p t1 t2 ⇒ p′
𝐵(𝑟 1 ) = v1 @𝑡 1
𝐹𝑔 (𝑛) = cond⊲⊳ 𝑟 1 𝑟 2 𝑛𝑡 𝑛 𝑓 @ itag
𝐵(𝑟 2 ) = v2 @𝑡 2
𝑛 ′ = if v1 ⊲⊳ v2 then 𝑛𝑡 else 𝑛 𝑓
[exec Cond]
S(𝐹, 𝑛, p, 𝑐, 𝐵) → S(𝐹, 𝑛 ′, p′, 𝑐, 𝐵)
Figure 4. Selected RTLT instruction transitions
i := nop n
| op ⊕ 𝑟𝑠1 𝑟𝑠2 𝑟𝑑 𝑛
| mov 𝑟𝑠 𝑟𝑑 𝑛
| movi a r𝑑 n
| cond⊲⊳ 𝑟 1 𝑟 2 𝑛𝑡 𝑛 𝑓
| call 𝑓 𝑟®𝑠 𝑟𝑑 𝑛
| ret r

no-op (go to n)
binary operation
move
move immediate
branch
call
return

and a set of possible error tags ranged over by err. In addition,
RTLT is parameterized by an arbitrary set of I-tags, ranged
over by itag; each instruction is labeled with an I-tag.
Figure 5 describes the syntax of RTLT instructions. We
use 𝑛 to range over labels for graph nodes and 𝑟 to range
over pseudo-registers. Each instruction carries the label of
the next node(s) to be executed. We reuse the arithmetic and
relational operators found in HLL.
An RTLT function 𝐹 is described by a graph 𝐹𝑔 , which is a
finite partial mapping from nodes to instructions; an entrypoint node; registers containing parameters; and a function
tag. Each function has an infinite bank of registers.
Program states and behaviors are similar to those in HLL.
A difference is in regular states S(𝐹, 𝑛, p, 𝑐, 𝐵), where program points are now tracked via node labels 𝑛 (there are no
local continuations) and variable environments are replaced
by register banks 𝐵, which map registers to atoms. Figure 4
gives transition judgements for RTLT instructions, omitting
calls, returns, and error rules. Each instruction invokes a tag
rule, which is passed the instruction’s I-tag in addition to
value and PC tags.

Figure 5. Syntax of RTLT instructions
Cond.

But the second join point needs to be associated with
the continuation of the statement, and it needs to be given
the PC tag from the split point as one of its arguments. To
do this, we generate a continuation of the form (join, ps ); 𝑘.
(join is a metavariable.) This continuation indicates that the
program passed through a split point earlier (in this case a
conditional) and has now reached the corresponding join
point. It is processed by judgement SkipJoin, which invokes
join p ps (p and ps are the current and split-point PC tags,
respectively), updates the PC tag to this result, and proceeds
with continuation 𝑘. For the if-then-else join we specify
join to be IfJoin and ps to be the split-point PC tag. The
same continuation mechanism is used for while statements
(specifying, say, WhileExit for join). A similar technique is
used to specify the control points associated with calls and
returns.
5.2

5.3

Compilation

We now describe compilation of HLL into RTLT by example. Compilation involves the translation of statements and
expressions into instructions, but also the injection of an
HLL tag policy P into an equivalent RTLT policy, I (P). The
per-opcode rules in I (P) begin by dispatching on I-tags: an
instruction’s tag rule effectively depends on both its opcode
and its I-tag. For compactness, we write rules in the form
opcode I-tag parameters ≜ rule-body. Many I-tags correspond
directly to source constructs, and their rule bodies simply
invoke the corresponding HLL tag rule. Other I-tags signal
administrative tag operations generated by the compiler. We

The Target Language: RTLT

RTLT is a deterministic, 3-address code, register transfer
abstract machine language based on CFG’s: it represents
functions as graphs, where each node is an individual instruction. Like HLL, its semantics are parameterized by an
instruction-level rule policy, i.e. sets of value tags T and PC
tags P, a set of tag rules covering each possible instruction,
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give some of the rules for I (P) below, interleaved with the
discussion of the relevant compilation cases.
The translation from HLL to RTLT decomposes expressions into linear sequences of RTLT instructions, and recursively translates statements into CFG’s. Functions and
programs in RTLT are extremely similar to those in HLL, so
the compiler has little to do for these, and we omit further
discussion of them.
Since most RTLT instructions incorporate an explicit successor node, the compiler builds CFG’s in reverse execution
order. Each translation function takes a source fragment, a
variable map (holding registers for parameters and locals),
and a target successor node; it returns an entry node 𝑛𝑒 into
the modified CFG.
Translation of expressions We write the expression
translation function as

≜ Const 𝑝 𝑡
≜ Var
( 𝑝 𝑡𝑠
(p, t) if ⊕ p ts1 ts2 ⇒ t
𝑝 𝑡𝑠 1 𝑡𝑠 2 ≜
err
if ⊕ p ts1 ts2 ⇒ err

movi
mov

ITconst 𝑝 𝑡
ITvar
𝑝 𝑡𝑠 𝑡𝑑

op ⊕

IT⊕

Translation of statements and functions The statement translation function is written 𝑛𝑒 : J𝑠K𝑛𝑠 where 𝑠 is a
source statement, 𝑛𝑠 a successor node parameter and 𝑛𝑒 the
generated entry node. Executing the resulting CFG, rooted
at 𝑛𝑒 and exiting to 𝑛𝑠 , will have the same effect in RTLT as
statement 𝑠 does in HLL. As with expressions, if evaluation of
𝑠 leads to a tag error, execution halts in E (err). Assignment
and sequencing CFG’s and their rule definitions in I (P):

𝑛𝑒 : 𝑟 = J𝑒K𝑛𝑠
where 𝑒 is the expression being translated, 𝑛𝑠 is the successor
node, 𝑛𝑒 is the entry node returned, and 𝑟 is a fresh register
generated to hold the result of 𝑒. The output of translation
is a CFG, rooted at 𝑛𝑒 and exiting to 𝑛𝑠 , whose execution
will have the effect of evaluating 𝑒 and (if this is successful)
placing its atom in register 𝑟 before continuing to 𝑛𝑠 . If evaluation of 𝑒 leads to a tag error err, execution of the subgraph
will halt in state E (err).
The translation function is defined by cases on syntax
constructors. We show the result of each translation as a
CFG diagram. Rounded white boxes represent single graph
nodes showing an instruction, its I-tag and node label. Recursive calls to translation functions generate subgraphs,
represented by shaded rectangular boxes.
Here are the cases for constants, variables and operations,
where 𝑟 𝑥 is the register mapped to hold the HLL variable 𝑥:

𝑛𝑒 : J𝑠 1 ; 𝑠 2 K𝑛𝑠
⇓

𝑛𝑒 : J𝑥 ..= 𝑒K𝑛𝑠
⇓

𝑛𝑒 : J𝑠 1 K𝑛1

𝑛𝑒 : 𝑟 = J𝑒K𝑛1

𝑛 1 : J𝑠 2 K𝑛𝑠

𝑛 1 : mov 𝑟 𝑟 𝑥 𝑛𝑠 @ ITassign

mov

ITassign 𝑝 𝑡𝑠 𝑡𝑑

≜ ..= 𝑝 𝑡𝑑 𝑡𝑠

Note that assignments and variable expressions both compile
to a mov, but the I-tags encode enough information about
the source provenance of the instruction to reproduce the
correct rule processing in the target.
Pseudo-instructions and join points The most interesting cases for statement compilation in our tagged world
are conditionals and while loops; for brevity, we focus on
the former.
𝑛𝑒 : JIf (𝑒 1 ⊲⊳ 𝑒 2 ) Then 𝑠𝑡 Else 𝑠 𝑓 K𝑛𝑠
⇓

𝑛𝑒 : 𝑟 = J𝑎K𝑛𝑠
⇓

𝑛𝑒 : 𝑟 = J𝑥K𝑛𝑠
⇓

𝑛𝑒 : mov 𝑟 𝑝𝑐 𝑟 𝑝𝑐 𝑛 1 @ ITsavePC

𝑛𝑒 : movi 𝑎 𝑟 𝑛𝑠 @ ITconst

𝑛𝑒 : mov 𝑟 𝑥 𝑟 𝑛𝑠 @ ITvar

𝑛 1 : 𝑟 1 = J𝑒 1 K𝑛2
𝑛 2 : 𝑟 2 = J𝑒 2 K𝑛3

𝑛𝑒 : 𝑟 = J𝑒 1 ⊕ 𝑒 2 K𝑛𝑠
⇓

𝑛 3 : cond⊲⊳ 𝑟 1 𝑟 2 𝑛𝑡 𝑛 𝑓 @ ITifSplit
𝑛𝑡 : J𝑠𝑡 K𝑛4

𝑛𝑒 : 𝑟 1 = J𝑒 1 K𝑛1

𝑛 𝑓 : J𝑠 𝑓 K𝑛4

𝑛 4 : mov 𝑟 𝑝𝑐 𝑟 𝑝𝑐 𝑛𝑠 @ ITifJoin

𝑛 1 : 𝑟 2 = J𝑒 2 K𝑛2
𝑛 2 : op ⊕ 𝑟 1 𝑟 2 𝑟 𝑛𝑠 @ ITop ⊕

mov
cond⊲⊳
mov

To understand the tag-related behavior of the generated instructions, we must also examine the behavior of the RTLT
tag policy I (P), under which this code will execute. These
rules essentially replicate HLL’s tag processing in RTLT . The
definitions for expressions are:

ITsavePC 𝑝 _ _
ITifSplit 𝑝 ⊲⊳ 𝑡 1 𝑡 2
ITifJoin 𝑝 𝑡𝑠 𝑡𝑑

≜ (𝑝,𝑝)
≜ IfSplit 𝑝 ⊲⊳ 𝑡 1 𝑡 2
≜ IfJoin 𝑝 𝑡𝑠

Recall that these statements have multiple control points,
corresponding to splits and joins in program control flow,
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and that the PC tag at the split point needs to be passed as a
parameter to the rule at the matching join point. The compiled versions of these statements use pseudo-instructions to
save the split point PC tag (and a dummy value) and recover
this PC tag to use in join point rules. These instructions are
implemented as movs and distinguished by their I-tags.
When used to save PC tags at split points, mov ignores
the tag of the source register, and moves the current PC tag
into the tag portion of the destination register. When used
to recover the PC tag, it just passes the tag portion of the
register (𝑡𝑠 ) to the join point rule . The pseudo-instructions
for split and join points are always generated in pairs, and
for each instruction, the same “save” register 𝑟 𝑝𝑐 is used for
both source and destination, leaving the value part of 𝑟 𝑝𝑐
unchanged. Since split-join pairs can be arbitrarily nested,
the set of “save” registers that are live at any given program
point form a stack.
5.4

passes, e.g., an optimization pass whose compilation scheme
replaces one instruction with another (as opposed to translating one source construct to multiple target constructs), the
matching relation is easy to define, as the execution moves
in lockstep. RTLgenT is, of course, more complicated, further
underscoring that it was a key pass to study.
5.5

Theorem 5.1. (Semantic Preservation RTLgenT )
Let 𝑆 and P be a HLL program and policy respectively. Let 𝐶 be
the RTLT result of compiling 𝑆 and I (P) the result of compiling
P. Under their respective semantics and policies: If 𝑆 does not
Go Wrong, then the behavior displayed by 𝐶 is displayed by
𝑆. Formally: ∀𝐵.safe(𝑆) → 𝐶 I ( P) ⇓ 𝐵 → 𝑆 P ⇓ 𝐵.
The proof of theorem 5.1 is mostly straightforward; we focus discussion on subtle or novel clauses of the matching
relation.
The matching relation is hierarchical. It is defined on
states, which in turn requires the definition of matching
on functions, atoms, tag errors, call stacks, environments etc.
Many of these constituent matchings are straightforward,
because the matched structures are either very similar in
both languages (e.g., call, return, and fail-stop states) or because they are relatively simple (e.g., atoms, tag errors, or
environments). We focus our discussion on regular states,
which describe computation internal to a function. Recall
that HLL regular states S(𝐹, 𝑠, 𝑘, p, 𝑐, 𝐸) describe the current
computation with a statement-under-focus, 𝑠, and a (local)
continuation, 𝑘, which describes the rest of the function
body. (All HLL expressions are embedded in statements.)
RTLT regular states S(𝐹, 𝑛, p, 𝑐, 𝐵) describe the current computation with a node label 𝑛 pointing at an instruction in the
CFG (contained in the function 𝐹 ). To preserve semantics, we
just need to ensure that HLL and RTLT functions (in regular
states) step to a return state at the same time, carrying matching atoms. However, the only way to guarantee this is to
make sure that the computation in 𝑠 and 𝑘 match the computation starting at 𝑛, i.e., that they update environment 𝐸 and
register bank 𝐵 in parallel, that they make the same intermediate computations, etc. Thus, we need to define matching
for statements, continuations and expressions. Each of these
individual relations carries pertinent information, such as
the state of the register bank or specially pre-defined return
registers, which we elide until we discuss particular clauses
of the relation.
We match each statement 𝑠 to a CFG interval [𝑛𝑒 ,𝑛𝑠 ), written 𝑠 ∼ [𝑛𝑒 , 𝑛𝑠 ). An interval is a contiguous chain of instructions (similar to the diagrams in §5.3) that starts at the instruction labeled 𝑛𝑒 and ends at an instruction whose successor
is 𝑛𝑠 . (The instruction at 𝑛𝑠 is not part of the interval.) Intervals need not be linear; they may branch so long as the
last instruction in each branch has 𝑛𝑠 as a sucessor. Similarly,
𝑒 ∼𝑟 [𝑛𝑒 , 𝑛𝑠 ) denotes that expression 𝑒 matches an interval,

Verification Approach

The verification of RTLgenT and DeadcodeT (§6.1) follow the
general framework laid out in CompCert [15]. Our notion
of semantics preservation is refinement-for-safe-programs:
Any behavior exhibited by the target program must be one
exhibited by the source program. In other words, compilation
should not introduce new behaviors in the target. Behavioral
equality is defined up to equality of results and errors, i.e.,
Terminate 𝑎 = Terminate 𝑎 ′ iff 𝑎 = 𝑎 ′ and Fail-stop 𝑒𝑟𝑟
= Fail-stop 𝑒𝑟𝑟 ′ iff 𝑒𝑟𝑟 = 𝑒𝑟𝑟 ′. Further, we only want to
consider safe source programs, i.e. those that do not Go
Wrong. This is to allow the compiler the flexibility of, for
example, removing a division by zero whose result is unused.
Each Tagine pass is proved via a forward simulation
𝜎1 → 𝜎2
𝜎1

𝜎2

𝜎1 ∼ 𝜍 1
𝜍1

𝜎2 ∼ 𝜍 2
𝜍 1 →∗ 𝜍 2

RTLgenT Theorem and Matching Relation

𝜍2

which, coupled with the determinacy of the target’s semantics, implies refinement (see Leroy [15] for more details). In
the commuting diagram, which shows a general forward simulation, 𝜎 ranges over source states and 𝜍 over target states.
Solid lines represent premises, dashed lines proof obligations, ⇀∗ represents zero-or-more steps and ∼ is a matching
relation between source and target program states.
Matching relations—which describe things such as the environments, what computations are to be performed next, or
the functions on the call stack, in each language—are exactly
the context that provide the formal meaning of what it means
for the executions to be equivalent. Defining the matching
relation is usually the most intricate part of a simulation
argument. Intuitively, matching relates equivalent points
in the source and target programs’ execution. For simple
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where 𝑟 is the register in which the expression’s atom will be
stored by the code in the interval. Expression and statement
matching are naturally closely related to their compilation
schemes (cf §5.3). Here are some simple cases:
Skip Skip ∼ [𝑛𝑠 , 𝑛𝑠 ). (Here the interval [𝑛𝑠 , 𝑛𝑠 ) is empty.)
Seq 𝑠 1 ; 𝑠 2 ∼ [𝑛𝑒 , 𝑛𝑠 ) if ∃𝑛 1 s.t. 𝑠 1 ∼ [𝑛𝑒 , 𝑛 1 ) ∧ 𝑠 2 ∼ [𝑛 1, 𝑛𝑠 ).
Add 𝑒 1 + 𝑒 2 ∼𝑟 [𝑛𝑒 , 𝑛𝑠 ) if ∃𝑛 1, 𝑛 2, 𝑟 1, 𝑟 2 s.t.
• 𝑒 1 ∼𝑟 1 [𝑛𝑒 , 𝑛 1 ) and 𝑒 2 ∼𝑟 2 [𝑛 1, 𝑛 2 )
• 𝑛 2 : op+ 𝑟 1 𝑟 2 𝑟 𝑛𝑠
• sundry side conditions, e.g.: [𝑛 1, 𝑛 2 ) does not overwrite
𝑟 1 , [𝑛𝑒 , 𝑛𝑠 ) does not overwrite registers holding variables
of the HLL environment, etc.
Function termination provides some more complex examples of matching relations. In HLL, a function terminates
when a Return statement is under focus, or when a function
“falls through” by reaching the end of its body (Skip under
focus and empty 𝑘). When falling through, functions return
a default atom 𝑎𝑑 . RTLT functions have a single exit point,
so function compilation predefines a return value register
𝑟 ret , and two instructions:
• 𝑛 def : movi 𝑎𝑑 𝑟 ret 𝑛 ret
• 𝑛 ret : ret 𝑟 ret
The matching relation for Return statements may look disconcerting upon first examination: label 𝑛𝑠 is free because
the mov jumps to the pre-defined exit 𝑛 ret .
Return Return 𝑒 ∼ [𝑛𝑒 , 𝑛𝑠 ) if ∃𝑛 1, 𝑟 1 s.t.
• 𝑒 ∼𝑟 1 [𝑛𝑒 , 𝑛 1 )
• 𝑛 1 : mov 𝑟 1 𝑟 ret 𝑛 ret
Continuation matching is defined in terms of a single CFG
node, as illustrated by the fall-through continuation.
Fall through emp ∼ 𝑛 def if
• 𝑛 def : movi 𝑎𝑑 𝑟 ret 𝑛 ret
• 𝑛 ret : ret 𝑟 ret
𝑛 ret is effectively the end of the interval corresponding to
every continuation.
The matching clauses we have seen so far are only slightly
modified from CompCert’s RTLgen. The next clause is novel,
however.
k-Join (join, ps ); 𝑘 ∼ 𝑛𝑒 if ∃𝑛 1 s.t.
• 𝑛𝑒 : mov 𝑟 𝑝𝑐 𝑟 𝑝𝑐 𝑛 1 @ itag
• 𝑘 ∼ 𝑛1
• ∀𝑞, 𝑞𝑠 ∈P . mov itag 𝑞 𝑞𝑠 _ = join 𝑞 𝑞𝑠
• 𝑟 𝑝𝑐 contains 𝑝𝑠 .
The first two conditions shows that an HLL join rule on top
of the local continuation matches to the instruction at 𝑛𝑒 . Recall that this is a pseudo-instruction that will invoke a RTLT
level join rule (cf §5.3). Consider SkipJoin (Fig. 3): in order to
process join points uniformly, it abstracts over the rule join.
Without this abstraction, we would need an additional transition rule for each type of join point (there are three), in both
HLL and RTLT semantics. As shown in the If-Then-Else
compilation diagram, split and join point instructions are
generated at the same time; hence, it is easy to ensure they

get corresponding split and join rule I-tags. During execution, however, arbitrary code runs between the split and join
points; hence, the third condition (relating mov and join) insists that the mov carries the corresponding (and therefore
correct) I-tag, i.e., that (mov itag) invokes join. The last condition, ensuring that mov is actually invoked on the split point
PC, is really an invariant—one whose maintenance is quite
involved. We have to parameterize all compilation functions
with stacks (to account for nesting of split/join points) of
these “save” registers, and augment all matching relations
with the invariant that none of the described computations
trample these “save” registers.
To summarize matching over regular states:
Regular states S(𝐹, 𝑠, 𝑘, p, 𝑐, 𝐸) ∼ S(𝐹 ′, 𝑛, p′, 𝑐 ′, 𝐵) if ∃𝑛 1 s.t.
• 𝑠 ∼ [𝑛, 𝑛 1 ) ∧ 𝑘 ∼ 𝑛 1
• 𝐹 ∼ 𝐹 ′ ∧ 𝑝 ∼ 𝑝′ ∧ 𝑐 ∼ 𝑐′ ∧ 𝐸 ∼ 𝐵
As previously mentioned, we elide the details of these
straightforward matchings

6

Optimizations

We have analyzed the CompCert RTL-improving passes
Deadcode, CSE (common sub-expression elimination), and
ConstProp to determine what information about policies is
needed to adapt these optimizations to a tagged setting. All
these passes have the effect of removing instructions, so the
key concern is whether it is valid to skip the corresponding
tag rule executions as well. As mentioned in §4, we have
identified several simple and intuitive conditions on tag rules
that, in various combinations, are sufficient to keep these
optimizations sound. These conditions are dynamic, and not
decidable in general at compile time, but there are simple
conservative static approximations for each of them. We now
consider the optimizations in turn, defining the conditions
as they become relevant.
6.1

The DeadcodeT Pass

CompCert’s Deadcode removes reachable but redundant instructions. In ordinary RTL, an instruction is dead if its destination register is dead, and a register is dead if it is not
passed as an operand to any following instruction (before
being re-defined). In RTLT , since instructions and their tag
rules get their operands from the same registers, the standard notion of register liveness still holds, as whenever a
value is passed to an instruction, its tags are passed to that
instruction’s tag rule.
However the standard notion of instruction deadness is
not sufficient in RTLT , because even if an instruction’s result
value is not used, its tag rule might still fail-stop, change
the PC tag, or change internal tag policy state. The latter
two forms of state behave very similarly; since our prototype compiler does not support internal tag policy state, we
consider only PC tag changes in the remainder of the paper.
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In our adaptation DeadcodeT , we found that the conjunction of two conditions on rule evaluation were sufficient for
a tag rule to be treated as dead:

verifing that if a RTLT rule has property 𝑋 , so does its related HLL rule. We define the RTLT flags in Coq proof mode
by providing a Some (requiring a proof of the property it
carries) or None witness. Eliminating cases on HLL flags in
order to provide such witnesses defines RTLT flags from HLL
ones. This approach helps us validate our policy compilation.
As an example, if we wanted to show a witness for Some
(𝐻 :DF S (op ⊕ )), not having to case analyze the HLL flag
(option DF S (⊕)) would be a hint that the definition of
op ⊕ (via compilation of the HLL policy) is wrong. This validation mechanism caught several bugs in our initial compiler
code.
There is a caveat attached to our verification. In Tagine’s
current implementation, we only model HLL policy signatures, not actual rule definitions. Therefore, the compiler
cannot derive the HLL flag settings by inspecting the policy,
but instead relies on external specification of the flag settings
as axioms. As future work, we envision modelling the policy
rule language in detail, so that properties of HLL policies
can be extracted by a provably-correct static analysis.

• The rule never fail-stops.
DF S(rule) ≜ ∀®
𝑥 . rule 𝑥® ̸⇒ err
This condition is in fact necessary to allow rule execution to be skipped: if there is a chance a rule might
fail-stop, then skipping it might not preserve fail-stop
behavior of the program.
• The rule outputs the same PC tag that it received, if it
does not fail-stop, i.e. the rule exhibits “PC-purity”.
PCP (rule) ≜ ∀𝑝 𝑥®. rule 𝑝 𝑥® ⇒ (𝑝 ′, 𝑥®′) → 𝑝 = 𝑝 ′
Since the PC tag is threaded throughout the program’s
execution, it can effectively be used to pass state, which
could affect a fail-stop decision in a later rule. PCP
simply says that a rule is side-effect-free with respect
to the PC tag.
(DF S ∧PCP) is used as an additional guard to the standard
notion of instruction deadness, both in the liveness analysis
and the code transformation. Although these conditions are
not statically computable, they have simple conservative
approximations: A rule must be DF S if it never returns a
tag error, and must be PCP if the output PC tag is always
syntactically equal to the input PC tag.
6.2

6.3

CSE (Common-Subexpression Elimination)

This pass replaces repetitions of an op ⊕ instruction (the common sub-expression) with a mov instruction that writes the
previously computed value into the op ⊕ destination register.
The variety of CSE implemented by CompCert is local
value numbering (LVN). LVN works by maintaining a bijective mapping between symbolic identifiers (the value numbers) and expressions (i.e., variables or operations). It operates as a forward dataflow analysis over extended basic
blocks. When encountering a (syntactic) expression, LVN
checks the map to see if it already has a value number; if
not, a fresh value number is assigned to the expression, and
the map is updated accordingly. In standard LVN, an expression’s value number is cleared if any of its constituent
variables are redefined.
1: z = x + y
1: z = x + y
2: c = a + b
2: c = a + b
3: w = x + y
3: w = z
4: x = 5
4: x = 5
5: v = x + y
5: v = x + y
pre-CSE
post-CSE
In the pre-CSE pseudocode, while lines 1, 3 and 5 contain a
syntactically equivalent expression (x + y), only lines 1 and
3 have a common sub-expression, as they perform the same
computation, while line 5 does not, due to the redefinition
of x on line 4. LVN determines this by assigning the first
repetition (line 3) the same value number as the original
(line 1), because nothing causes it to be cleared from the map.
However, the repetition on line 5 gets a new value number
because x is redefined on line 4. LVN then replaces repeated
sub-expressions whose value number is associated with a

DeadcodeT Theorem and Verification

Theorem 6.1. (Semantic Preservation DeadcodeT ) Let 𝑆
and P be a RTLT program and policy respectively, and 𝐶 be
the RTLT result of performing the deadcode optimization on
𝑆. Under RTLT semantics and the policy P: If 𝑆 does not Go
Wrong, then the behavior displayed by 𝐶 is displayed by 𝑆.
Formally: ∀𝐵.safe(𝑆) → 𝐶 P ⇓ 𝐵 → 𝑆 P ⇓ 𝐵.
Having covered the generalities in §5.4, we discuss here how
the analysis and proof of theorem 6.1 are driven by a set of
flags that indicate which properties hold on the HLL rules.
As optimizations work over RTLT , it is the properties of
RTLT rules that we are interested in. Just as we define RTLT
policies out of HLL ones, we define RTLT flags out of HLL
ones and prove that whenever a RTLT rule has a property, so
does the corresponding HLL rule. e.g., PCP (mov ITassign)
only if PCP (..=).
In the correctness proof, we would like these flags to have
type Prop, but in the compiler, we need them to be computable. So, we encode them as option Props. For example,
Some (𝐻 :DF S (op ⊕ )) tells the compiler that op ⊕ does not
fail-stop and provides the Prop 𝐻 :DF S (op ⊕ ) for use in the
proof. The None case tells the compiler the property does
not hold.
This dependent type does double duty: It helps us cleanly
define RTLT flags out of HLL ones while simultaneously
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𝑟 1 := 3@𝑐 1, 𝑟 2 := 4@𝑐 2 , folding makes this change:

variable by an mov from that variable, as illustrated in the
post-CSE pseudocode.
The standard notion of LVN guarantees that two expressions with the same value number are equivalent computations. In the Tagine setting, this is enough to guarantee that
the rules of two expressions with the same value number
will receive the same value tag inputs, but we still need to
account for the PC tag input. The intuition is that LVN is
sound in Tagine whenever op ⊕ is insensitive to the PC tag
input or the repeated rules receive the same PC tag input as
the original. We present two cases where this holds.
(a) When the op’s rule is (weakly) insensitive to the PC tag
input, meaning that it is PCP, and its PC tag input influences
neither its output value tags nor whether it fail-stops.

op+ 𝑟 1 𝑟 2 𝑟𝑑 @ IT+ ⇒ movi (7@_) 𝑟𝑑 @ (ITp + 𝑐 1 𝑐 2 )
movi is defined to invoke op+ on 𝑐 1 and 𝑐 2 when given I-tag
(ITp + 𝑐 1 𝑐 2 ), and 𝑟𝑑 is tagged with the result.
The second approach applies when we can statically compute a concrete output value tag for op ⊕ , which occurs in the
following cases: (1) If op ⊕ is PCP 3 and produces a constant
value tag, implying insensitivity to all its inputs. In this case
we do not require concrete inputs. (2) If op ⊕ is PCP, its
value tag output is simply propagated from one of its inputs,
and that input is known at compile time. (3) If op ⊕ is strongly
PC insensitive (i.e., the PC tag input does not influence the
rule’s output), the input value tags are known, and we can
evaluate the rule at compile time. If the computed result is
a fail-stop, the pass does not replace the op ⊕ , preserving
fail-stop behavior.
Neither of these approaches is strictly more useful or applicable than the other. The first approach requires concrete
tag values but can deal with dynamic PC tag input. This
approach however, also generates more I-tags, which will
cause more compulsory misses. The second approach does
not always require concrete tag values, but is only applicable
in rather ad hoc circumstances.

WPCI (rule) ≜ PCP (rule) ∧ (∀𝑝 1, 𝑝 2, v®.
(∀𝑝 1′ 𝑝 2′ v®1′ v®2′ . rule 𝑝 1 v® ⇒ (𝑝 1′ , v®1′ ) ∧
rule 𝑝 2 v® ⇒ (𝑝 2′ , v®2′ ) → v®1′ = v®2′ )
∧ rule 𝑝 1 v® ⇒ err ↔ rule 𝑝 2 v® ⇒ err)
The intuition for PC insensitivity is that a rule should “do
nothing” with the PC tag, and in the case of weak PC insensitivity, propagating the input PC tag is the most innocuous
choice for the output PC tag. In this case, the standard definition of LVN is already sound in Tagine.
(b) When a repeated op’s rule can be guaranteed to receive
the same PC tag input as the original because all intervening
instructions between the original sub-expression (including
that sub-expression itself) and a candidate repetition are
PCP.
In summary, LVN in Tagine must modify standard LVN to
clear out the value numbers of all non-WPCI instructions
upon encountering a non-PCP instruction.
We have implemented this revised version of CSE in Tagine, but have not completed its verification.
6.4

7

Coq Development

The proof of RTLgenT is ∼1700 lines, while DeadcodeT has
a proof of ∼650 lines. These numbers reflect formalization
specific to the passes. From CompCert, we also used some
proofs on the general metatheory of simulations.
The goal of keeping the components of Tagine as decoupled as possible led us to adopt a highly modularized and
functorized architecture in Coq. In particular, IRs and compiler passes do not depend on semantics or proofs. However,
to implement monitoring at RTLT -level, Tagine must invent
new RTLT tags and policies. Moreover, while the abstract
definition of RTLT is independent of HLL, all Tagine-RTLT
notions (tags, language, policies, flags, semantics) must be
parameterized by HLL ones. This means that optimization
passes must be functors over Tagine-RTLT and therefore
parameterized by HLL tags, policies and flags as well. As examples, the proofs of RTLgenT and DeadcodeT are functors
over eleven and eight other modules, respectively.

ConstProp

ConstProp folds constants (concrete values known at compile time) by turning op ⊕ s whose results can be computed
at compile time into movis. It also performs constant propagation by a dataflow analysis over the contents of registers
to compute their abstract values.
As a running example, consider a register bank with 𝑟 1 :=
3, 𝑟 2 := 4. Standard constant folding makes the change:
op+ 𝑟 1 𝑟 2 𝑟𝑑 ⇒ movi 7 𝑟𝑑

8

In Tagine we need to compute a tag to write into 𝑟𝑑 as well.
We outline two approaches to making folding sound in Tagine.
The first approach applies when the op ⊕ to be folded has
constant operand tags. This approach permits folding by
(ultimately) invoking op ⊕ despite replacing the op ⊕ with
a movi. It does so with a special I-tag that can take parameters, e.g., (ITp ⊕ 𝑡 1 𝑡 2 ), where everything enclosed by
the parentheses is one I-tag. In our running example, with

Related Work

Hardware reference monitors and other secure hardware
platforms have been the focus of much recent attention as a
potential foundation for secure systems. Some target a specific security policy; for example, CHERI [23] implements
compartmentalization using capabilities. PIPE instead aims
3 In

HLL, expression rules are designed to be implicitly P C P: they do not
even produce an output PC tag. Therefore RTLT rules defined from HLL
expression rules will always be P C P.
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to be general [7, 8]. It has been used to enforce information flow control [5], stack safety [19], and capability-based
heap-safety, among other micropolicies [4]. Abate et. al. use
PIPE as an example enforcement mechanism for their Secure
Compartmentalized Compilation property [1].
Aspect-Oriented Programming bears a structural similarity to the reference monitor approach; when used for security
it also entails interleaving policy validation with application
code [13]. Advice points are akin to our control points. But
AOP’s advice code is normally written in the same language
as the underlying program and can operate on the full program environment, which naturally suggests a semantics
and implementation based on weaving together the program
and advice. While parts of AOP semantics have been formalized [9, 22], we are not aware of any attempts to prove
correctness of AOP tool implementations.
Like our work, much of the literature in compiler verification focuses on toy compilers that illustrate a key challenge [17], or verifies compilation of a specific, small part of
a language [16]. The VLISP [12] project is notable in that it
has a correctness proof for an implementation of LISP. But
while rigorous, it is not machine checked. CompCert [15] and
CakeML [14] stand alone as industrial strength, machinechecked, verified compilers; the former has been used to
explore verifying optimizations, while CakeML has focused
on reducing the trusted computing base, and verifies other
parts of the run time, such as the garbage collector.
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